CryptoDB
Triplex: an Efficient and One-Pass Leakage-Resistant Mode of Operation
| Authors: |
|
|---|---|
| Download: | |
| Presentation: | Slides |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces and analyzes Triplex, a leakage-resistant mode of operation based on Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBCs) with 2n-bit tweaks. Triplex enjoys beyond-birthday ciphertext integrity in the presence of encryption and decryption leakage in a liberal model where all intermediate computations are leaked in full and only two TBC calls operating a long-term secret are protected with implementationlevel countermeasures. It provides beyond-birthday confidentiality guarantees without leakage, and standard confidentiality guarantees with leakage for a single-pass mode embedding a re-keying process for the bulk of its computations (i.e., birthday confidentiality with encryption leakage under a bounded leakage assumption). Triplex improves leakage-resistant modes of operation relying on TBCs with n-bit tweaks when instantiated with large-tweak TBCs like Deoxys-TBC (a CAESAR competition laureate) or Skinny (used by the Romulus finalist of the NIST lightweight crypto competition). Its security guarantees are maintained in the multi-user setting. |
BibTeX
@article{tches-2022-32359,
title={Triplex: an Efficient and One-Pass Leakage-Resistant Mode of Operation},
journal={IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
publisher={Ruhr-Universität Bochum},
volume={2022, Issue 4},
pages={135-162},
url={https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9816},
doi={10.46586/tches.v2022.i4.135-162},
author={Yaobin Shen and Thomas Peters and François-Xavier Standaert and Gaëtan Cassiers and Corentin Verhamme},
year=2022
}