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Fully-Succinct Multi-Key Homomorphic Signatures from Standard Assumptions
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| Conference: | CRYPTO 2024 |
| Abstract: | Multi-Key Homomorphic Signatures (MKHS) allow one to evaluate a function on data signed by distinct users while producing a succinct and publicly-verifiable certificate of the correctness of the result. All the constructions of MKHS in the state of the art achieve a weak level of succinctness where signatures are succinct in the total number of inputs but grow linearly with the number of users involved in the computation. The only exception is a SNARK-based construction which relies on a strong notion of knowledge soundness in the presence of signing oracles that not only requires non-falsifiable assumptions but also encounters some impossibility results. In this work, we present the first construction of MKHS that are fully succinct (also with respect to the number of users) while achieving adaptive security under standard falsifiable assumptions. Our result is achieved through a novel combination of batch arguments for NP (BARGs) and functional commitments (FC), and yields diverse MKHS instantiations for circuits of unbounded depth based on either pairing or lattice assumptions. Additionally, our schemes support efficient verification with pre-processing, and they can easily be extended to achieve multi-hop evaluation and context-hiding. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{crypto-2024-34193,
title={Fully-Succinct Multi-Key Homomorphic Signatures from Standard Assumptions},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
doi={10.1007/978-3-031-68382-4_10},
author={Gaspard Anthoine and David Balbás and Dario Fiore},
year=2024
}