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Attacking ECDSA with Nonce Leakage by Lattice Sieving: Bridging the Gap with Fourier Analysis-based Attacks
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| Conference: | ASIACRYPT 2024 |
| Abstract: | The Hidden Number Problem (HNP) has found extensive applications in side-channel attacks against cryptographic schemes, such as ECDSA and Diffie-Hellman. There are two primary algorithmic approaches to solving the HNP: lattice-based attacks and Fourier analysis-based attacks. Lattice-based attacks exhibit better efficiency and require fewer samples when sufficiently long substrings of the nonces are known. However, they face significant challenges when only a small fraction of the nonce is leaked, such as 1-bit leakage, and their performance degrades in the presence of errors. In this paper, we address an open question by introducing an algorithmic tradeoff that significantly bridges the gap between these two approaches. By introducing a parameter $x$ to modify Albrecht and Heninger's lattice, the lattice dimension is reduced by approximately $(\log_2{x})/ l$, where $l$ represents the number of leaked bits. We present a series of new methods, including the interval reduction algorithm, several predicates, and the pre-screening technique. Furthermore, we extend our algorithms to solve the HNP with erroneous input. Our attack outperforms existing state-of-the-art lattice-based attacks against ECDSA. We obtain several records including 1-bit and less than 1-bit leakage on a 160-bit curve, while the best previous lattice-based attack for 1-bit leakage was conducted only on a 112-bit curve. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{asiacrypt-2024-34596,
title={Attacking ECDSA with Nonce Leakage by Lattice Sieving: Bridging the Gap with Fourier Analysis-based Attacks},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Yiming Gao and Jinghui Wang and Honggang Hu and Binang He},
year=2024
}