CryptoDB
PAKE Combiners and Efficient Post-Quantum Instantiations
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| Conference: | EUROCRYPT 2025 |
| Abstract: | Much work has been done recently on developing password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) mechanisms with post-quantum security. However, modern guidance recommends the use of hybrid schemes—schemes which rely on the combined hardness of a post-quantum assumption, e.g., Learning with Errors (LWE), and a more traditional assumption, e.g., decisional Diffie-Hellman. To date, there is no known hybrid PAKE construction, let alone a general method for achieving such. In this paper, we present two efficient PAKE combiners—algorithms that take two PAKEs satisfying mild assumptions, and output a third PAKE with combined security properties—and prove these combiners secure in the Universal Composability (UC) model. Our sequential combiner, instantiated with efficient existing PAKEs such as CPace (built on Diffie-Hellman-type assumptions) and CAKE (built on lattice assumptions), yields the first known hybrid PAKE. |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{eurocrypt-2025-35110,
title={PAKE Combiners and Efficient Post-Quantum Instantiations},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Julia Hesse and Michael Rosenberg},
year=2025
}