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Physical-bit Leakage Resilience of Linear Code-based Secret Sharing
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| Conference: | EUROCRYPT 2025 |
| Abstract: | Physical attacks through hardware bit probing expose significant vulnerabilities in cryptographic systems. This paper investigates the leakage resilience of linear code-based secret sharing schemes, including Shamir's secret sharing, under the threat of physical bit leakage. Our focus is on schemes over binary extension fields, which are prevalent in practical cryptographic applications. We present the following key results: \begin{enumerate} \item A novel dichotomy showing that every scheme is either perfectly secure or entirely insecure in the presence of any physical-bit leakage. \item A complete characterization of leakage resilience based on the minimal codewords in the dual code of the binary image code, providing new insights into the leakage structure. This is the first complete characterization in the context of leakage-resilient secret sharing. \item A Monte-Carlo construction of a variant of Shamir's secret sharing with high leakage resilience. \end{enumerate} |
BibTeX
@inproceedings{eurocrypt-2025-35136,
title={Physical-bit Leakage Resilience of Linear Code-based Secret Sharing},
publisher={Springer-Verlag},
author={Hai H. Nguyen},
year=2025
}