CryptoDB
Markus Schönauer
Publications
Year
Venue
Title
2023
TCHES
Protecting Dilithium against Leakage: Revisited Sensitivity Analysis and Improved Implementations
Abstract
CRYSTALS-Dilithium has been selected by the NIST as the new standard for post-quantum digital signatures. In this work, we revisit the side-channel countermeasures of Dilithium in three directions. First, we improve its sensitivity analysis by classifying intermediate computations according to their physical security requirements. Second, we provide improved gadgets dedicated to Dilithium, taking advantage of recent advances in masking conversion algorithms. Third, we combine these contributions and report performance for side-channel protected Dilithium implementations. Our benchmarking results additionally put forward that the randomized version of Dilithium can lead to significantly more efficient implementations (than its deterministic version) when side-channel attacks are a concern.
2023
TCHES
From MLWE to RLWE: A Differential Fault Attack on Randomized & Deterministic Dilithium
Abstract
The post-quantum digital signature scheme CRYSTALS-Dilithium has been recently selected by the NIST for standardization. Implementing CRYSTALSDilithium, and other post-quantum cryptography schemes, on embedded devices raises a new set of challenges, including ones related to performance in terms of speed and memory requirements, but also related to side-channel and fault injection attacks security. In this work, we investigated the latter and describe a differential fault attack on the randomized and deterministic versions of CRYSTALS-Dilithium. Notably, the attack requires a few instructions skips and is able to reduce the MLWE problem that Dilithium is based on to a smaller RLWE problem which can be practically solved with lattice reduction techniques. Accordingly, we demonstrated key recoveries using hints extracted on the secret keys from the same faulted signatures using the LWE with side-information framework introduced by Dachman-Soled et al. at CRYPTO’20. As a final contribution, we proposed algorithmic countermeasures against this attack and in particular showed that the second one can be parameterized to only induce a negligible overhead over the signature generation.
Coauthors
- Mélissa Azouaoui (2)
- Olivier Bronchain (2)
- Gaëtan Cassiers (1)
- Mohamed ElGhamrawy (1)
- Clément Hoffmann (1)
- Yulia Kuzovkova (1)
- Joost Renes (2)
- Tobias Schneider (2)
- Markus Schönauer (2)
- Okan Seker (1)
- François-Xavier Standaert (1)
- Christine van Vredendaal (2)