International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Shengli Liu

ORCID: 0000-0003-1366-8256

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2024
PKC
More Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Leakage and Tamper Resilience
Shuai Han Shengli Liu Dawu Gu
In this paper, we study the design of efficient signature and public-key encryption (PKE) schemes in the presence of both leakage and tampering attacks. Firstly, we formalize the strong leakage and tamper-resilient (sLTR) security model for signature, which provides strong existential unforgeability, and deals with bounded leakage and restricted tampering attacks, as a counterpart to the sLTR security introduced by Sun et al. (ACNS 2019) for PKE. Then, we present direct constructions of signature and chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) secure PKE schemes in the sLTR model, based on the matrix decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumptions (which covers the standard symmetric external DH (SXDH) and k-Linear assumptions) over asymmetric pairing groups. Our schemes avoid the use of heavy building blocks such as the true-simulation extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (tSE-NIZK) proposed by Dodis et al. (ASIACRYPT 2010), which are usually needed in constructing schemes with leakage and tamper-resilience. Especially, our SXDH-based signature and PKE schemes are more efficient than the existing schemes in the leakage and tamper-resilient setting: our signature scheme has only 4 group elements in the signature, which is about 5×~8× shorter, and our PKE scheme has only 6 group elements in the ciphertext, which is about 1.3×~3.3× shorter. Finally, we note that our signature scheme is the {\it first} one achieving strong existential unforgeability in the leakage and tamper-resilient setting, where strong existential unforgeability has important applications in building more complex primitives such as signcryption and authenticated key exchange.
2024
PKC
Multi-Hop Fine-Grained Proxy Re-Encryption
Yunxiao Zhou Shengli Liu Shuai Han
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext intended for Alice (delegator) to another ciphertext intended for Bob (delegatee) without revealing the underlying message. Recently, a new variant of PRE, namely fine-grained PRE (FPRE), was proposed in [Zhou et al., Asiacrypt 2023]. Generally, FPRE is designed for a function family F: each re-encryption key rk_{A→B}^f is associated with a function f ∈ F, and with rk_{A→B}^f, a proxy can transform Alice's ciphertext encrypting m to Bob's ciphertext encrypting f(m). However, their scheme only supports single-hop re-encryption and achieves only CPA security. In this paper, we formalize {\it multi-hop} FPRE (mFPRE) that supports multi-hop re-encryptions in the fine-grained setting, and propose two mFPRE schemes achieving CPA security and stronger HRA security (security against honest re-encryption attacks), respectively. -- For multi-hop FPRE, we formally define its syntax and formalize a set of security notions including CPA security, HRA security, undirectionality and ciphertext unlinkablity. HRA security is stronger and more reasonable than CPA security, and ciphertext unlinkablity blurs the proxy relations among a chain of multi-hop re-encryptions, hence providing better privacy. We establish the relations between these security notions. -- Our mFPRE schemes support fine-grained re-encryptions for bounded linear functions and have security based on the learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption in the standard model. In particular, one of our schemes is HRA secure and enjoys all the aforementioned desirable securities. To achieve CPA security and HRA security for mFPRE, we extend the framework of [Jafargholi et al., Crypto 2017] and the technique of the [Fuchsbauer et al., PKC 2019].
2024
PKC
Tagged Chameleon Hash from Lattices and Application to Redactable Blockchain
Yiming Li Shengli Liu
Chameleon hash (CH) is a trapdoor hash function. Generally it is hard to find collisions, but with the help of a trapdoor, finding collisions becomes easy. CH plays an important role in converting a conventional blockchain to a redactable one. However, most of existing CH schemes are too weak to support redactable blockchains. The currently known CH schemes serving for redactable blockchains have the best security of so-called ``full collision resistance (f-CR)'', but they are built either in the random oracle model or rely on heavy tools like the simulation-sound extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge (SSE-NIZK) proof system. Moreover, up to now there is no CH scheme with post-quantum f-CR security in the standard model. Therefore, no CH can support redactable blockchains in a post-quantum way without relying on random oracles. In this paper, we introduce a variant of CH, namely tagged chameleon hash (tCH). Tagged chameleon hash takes a tag into hash evaluations and collision finding algorithms. We define two security notions for tCH, restricted collision resistance (r-CR) and full collision resistance (f-CR), and prove the equivalence between r-CR and f-CR when tCH works in the one-time tag mode. We propose a tCH scheme from lattices without using any NIZK proof, and prove that its restricted collision resistance is reduced to the Short Integer Solution (SIS) assumption in the standard model. We also show how to apply tCH to a blockchain in one-time tag mode so that the blockchain can be compiled to a redactable one. Our tCH scheme provides the first post-quantum solution for redactable blockchains, without resorting to random oracles or NIZK proofs. Besides, we also construct a more efficient tCH scheme with r-CR tightly reduced to SIS in the random oracle model, which may be of independent interest.
2024
EUROCRYPT
Universal Composable Password Authenticated Key Exchange for the Post-Quantum World
You Lyu Shengli Liu Shuai Han
In this paper, we construct the first password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) scheme from isogenies with Universal Composable (UC) security in the random oracle model (ROM). We also construct the first two PAKE schemes with UC security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), one is based on the learning with error (LWE) assumption, and the other is based on the group-action decisional Diffie-Hellman (GA-DDH) assumption in the isogeny setting. To obtain our UC-secure PAKE scheme in ROM, we propose a generic construction of PAKE from basic lossy public key encryption (LPKE) and CCA-secure PKE. We also introduce a new variant of LPKE, named extractable LPKE (eLPKE). By replacing the basic LPKE with eLPKE, our generic construction of PAKE achieves UC security in QROM. The LPKE and eLPKE have instantiations not only from LWE but also from GA-DDH, which admit four specific PAKE schemes with UC security in ROM or QROM, based on LWE or GA-DDH.
2024
ASIACRYPT
Efficient Asymmetric PAKE Compiler from KEM and AE
You Lyu Shengli Liu Shuai Han
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) allows two parties to establish a secure session key with a shared low-entropy password $pw$. Asymmetric PAKE (aPAKE) extends PAKE in the client-server setting, and the server only stores a password file instead of the plain password so as to provide additional security guarantee when the server is compromised. In this paper, we propose a novel generic compiler from PAKE to aPAKE in the Universal Composable (UC) framework by making use of Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Authenticated Encryption (AE). -- Our compiler admits efficient instantiations from lattice to yield lattice-based post-quantum secure aPAKE protocols. When instantiated with Kyber (the standardized KEM algorithm by the NIST), the performances of our compiler outperform other lattice-based compilers (Gentry et al. CRYPTO 2006) in all aspects, hence yielding the most efficient aPAKE compiler from lattice. In particular, when applying our compiler to the UC-secure PAKE schemes (Santos et al. EUROCRYPT 2023, Beguinet et al. ACNS 2023), we obtain the most efficient UC-secure aPAKE schemes from lattice. -- Moreover, the instantiation of our compiler from the tightly-secure matrix DDH (MDDH)-based KEM (Pan et al. CRYPTO 2023) can compile the tightly-secure PAKE scheme (Liu et al. PKC 2023) to a tightly-secure MDDH-based aPAKE, which serves as the first tightly UC-secure aPAKE scheme.
2024
ASIACRYPT
Anamorphic Authenticated Key Exchange: Double Key Distribution under Surveillance
Weihao Wang Shuai Han Shengli Liu
Anamorphic encryptions and anamorphic signatures assume a double key pre-shared between two parties so as to enable the transmission of covert messages. How to securely and efficiently distribute a double key under the dictator's surveillance is a central problem for anamorphic cryptography, especially when the users are forced to surrender their long-term secret keys or even the randomness used in the algorithms to the dictator. In this paper, we propose Anamorphic Authentication Key Exchange (AM-AKE) to solve the problem. Similar to anamorphic encryption, AM-AKE contains a set of anamorphic algorithms besides the normal algorithms. With the help of the anamorphic algorithms in AM-AKE, the initiator and the responder are able to exchange not only a session key but also a double key. We define robustness and security notions for AM-AKE, and also prove some impossibility results on plain AM-AKE whose anamorphic key generation algorithm only outputs a key-pair. To bypass the impossibility results, we work on two sides. -- On the one side, for plain AM-AKE, the securities have to be relaxed to resist only passive attacks from the dictator. Under this setting, we propose a generic construction of two-pass plain AM-AKE from a two-pass AKE with partially randomness-recoverable algorithms. -- On the other side, we consider (non-plain) AM-AKE whose key generation algorithm also outputs an auxiliary trapdoor besides the key-pairs. We ask new properties from AKE: its key generation algorithm has secret extractability and other algorithms have separability. Based on such a two-pass AKE, we propose a generic construction of two-pass (non-plain) AM-AKE. The resulting AM-AKE enjoys not only robustness but also the strong security against any dictator knowing both users' secret keys and even the internal randomness of the AKE algorithms and implementing active attacks. Finally, we present concrete AM-AKE schemes from the popular SIG+KEM paradigm and three-KEM paradigm for constructing AKE.
2023
PKC
EKE Meets Tight Security in the Universally Composable Framework
(Asymmetric) Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange ((a)PAKE) protocols allow two parties establish a session key with a pre-shared low-entropy password. In this paper, we show how Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) compiler [Bellovin and Merritt, S&P 1992] meets tight security in the Universally Composable (UC) framework. We propose a strong 2DH variant of EKE, denoted by 2DH-EKE, and prove its tight security in the UC framework based on the CDH assumption. The efficiency of 2DH-EKE is comparable to the original EKE, with only O(\lambda) bits growth in communication (\lambda the security parameter), and two (resp., one) extra exponentiation in computation for client (resp., server). We also develop an asymmetric PAKE scheme 2DH-aEKE from 2DH-EKE. The security reduction loss of 2DH-aEKE is N, the total number of client-server pairs. With a meta-reduction, we formally prove that such a factor N is inevitable in aPAKE. Namely, our 2DH-aEKE meets the optimal security loss. As a byproduct, we further apply our technique to PAKE protocols like SPAKE2 and PPK in the relaxed UC framework, resulting in their 2DH variants with tight security from the CDH assumption.
2023
PKC
Fine-grained Verifier NIZK and Its Applications
In this paper, we propose a new type of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK), called Fine-grained Verifier NIZK (FV-NIZK), which provides more flexible and more fine-grained verifiability of proofs than standard NIZK that supports public verifiability and designated-verifier NIZK (DV-NIZK) that supports private verifiability. FV-NIZK has two statistically equivalent verification approaches: -- a master verification using the master secret key msk; -- a fine-grained verification using a derived secret key sk_d, which is derived from msk w.r.t. d (which may stand for user identity, email address, vector, etc.). We require unbounded simulation soundness (USS) of FV-NIZK to hold, even if an adversary obtains derived secret keys sk_d with d of its choices, and define proof pseudorandomness which stipulates the pseudorandomness of proofs for adversaries that are not given any secret key. We present two instantiations of FV-NIZK for linear subspace languages, based on the matrix decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption. One of the FV-NIZK instantiations is pairing-free and achieves almost tight USS and proof pseudorandomness. We illustrate the usefulness of FV-NIZK by showing two applications and obtain the following pairing-free schemes: -- the first almost tightly multi-challenge CCA (mCCA)-secure inner-product functional encryption (IPFE) scheme without pairings; -- the first public-key encryption (PKE) scheme that reconciles the inherent contradictions between public verifiability and anonymity. We formalize such PKE as Fine-grained Verifiable PKE (FV-PKE), which derives a special key from the decryption secret key, such that for those who obtain the derived key, they can check the validity of ciphertexts but the anonymity is lost from their views (CCA-security still holds for them), while for others who do not get the derived key, they cannot do the validity check but the anonymity holds for them. Our FV-PKE scheme achieves almost tight mCCA-security for adversaries who obtain the derived keys, and achieves almost tight ciphertext pseudorandomness (thus anonymity) for others who do not get any derived key.
2023
EUROCRYPT
Almost Tight Multi-User Security under Adaptive Corruptions & Leakages in the Standard Model
Shuai Han Shengli Liu Dawu Gu
In this paper, we consider tight multi-user security under adaptive corruptions, where the adversary can adaptively corrupt some users and obtain their secret keys. We propose generic constructions for a bunch of primitives, and the instantiations from the matrix decision Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumptions yield the following schemes: (1) the first digital signature (SIG) scheme achieving almost tight strong EUF-CMA security in the multi-user setting with adaptive corruptions in the standard model; (2) the first public-key encryption (PKE) scheme achieving almost tight IND-CCA security in the multi-user multi-challenge setting with adaptive corruptions in the standard model; (3) the first signcryption (SC) scheme achieving almost tight privacy and authenticity under CCA attacks in the multi-user multi-challenge setting with adaptive corruptions in the standard model. As byproducts, our SIG and SC naturally derive the first strongly secure message authentication code (MAC) and the first authenticated encryption (AE) schemes achieving almost tight multi-user security under adaptive corruptions in the standard model. We further optimize constructions of SC, MAC and AE to admit better efficiency. Furthermore, we consider key leakages besides corruptions, as a natural strengthening of tight multi-user security under adaptive corruptions. This security considers a more natural and more complete "all-or-part-or-nothing" setting, where secret keys of users are either fully exposed to adversary ("all"), or completely hidden to adversary ("nothing"), or partially leaked to adversary ("part"), and it protects the uncorrupted users even with bounded key leakages. All our schemes additionally support bounded key leakages and enjoy full compactness. This yields the first SIG, PKE, SC, MAC, AE schemes achieving almost tight multi-user security under both adaptive corruptions and leakages.
2023
CRYPTO
Almost Tight Multi-User Security under Adaptive Corruptions from LWE in the Standard Model
In this work, we construct the {\it first} digital signature (SIG) and public-key encryption (PKE) schemes with almost tight multi-user security under adaptive corruptions based on the learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption in the standard model. Our PKE scheme achieves almost tight IND-CCA security and our SIG scheme achieves almost tight strong EUF-CMA security, both in the multi-user setting with adaptive corruptions. The security loss is quadratic in the security parameter, and independent of the number of users, signatures or ciphertexts. Previously, such schemes were only known to exist under number-theoretic assumptions or in classical random oracle model, thus vulnerable to quantum adversaries. To obtain our schemes from LWE, we propose new frameworks for constructing SIG and PKE with a core technical tool named {\it probabilistic} quasi-adaptive hash proof system (pr-QA-HPS). As a new variant of HPS, our pr-QA-HPS provides {\it probabilistic} public and private evaluation modes that may toss coins. This is in stark contrast to the traditional HPS [Cramer and Shoup, Eurocrypt 2002] and existing variants like approximate HPS [Katz and Vaikuntanathan, Asiacrypt 2009], whose public and private evaluations are deterministic in their inputs. Moreover, we formalize a new property called evaluation indistinguishability by requiring statistical indistinguishability of the two probabilistic evaluation modes, even in the presence of the secret key. The evaluation indistinguishability, as well as other nice properties resulting from the probabilistic features of pr-QA-HPS, are crucial for the multi-user security proof of our frameworks under adaptive corruptions. As for instantiations, we construct pr-QA-HPS from the LWE assumption and prove its properties with almost tight reductions, which admit almost tightly secure LWE-based SIG and PKE schemes under our frameworks. Along the way, we also provide new almost-tight reductions from LWE to multi-secret LWE, which may be of independent interest.
2023
ASIACRYPT
Fine-Grained Proxy Re-Encryption: Definitions & Constructions from LWE
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a proxy with a re-encryption key to translate a ciphertext intended for Alice (delegator) to another ciphertext intended for Bob (delegatee) without revealing the underlying message. However, with PRE, Bob can obtain the whole message from the re-encrypted ciphertext, and Alice cannot take flexible control of the extent of the message transmitted to Bob. In this paper, we propose a new variant of PRE, called Fine-Grained PRE (FPRE), to support fine-grained re-encryptions. An FPRE is associated with a function family F, and each re-encryption key rk_{A→B}^f is associated with a function f ∈ F. With FPRE, Alice now can authorize re-encryption power to proxy by issuing rk_{A→B}^f to it, with f chosen by herself. Then the proxy can translate ciphertext encrypting m to Bob's ciphertext encrypting f(m) with such a fine-grained re-encryption key, and Bob only obtains a function of message m. In this way, Alice can take flexible control of the message spread by specifying functions. For FPRE, we formally define its syntax and formalize security notions including CPA security, ciphertext pseudo-randomness, unidirectionality, non-transitivity, collusion-safety under adaptive corruptions in the multi-user setting. Moreover, we propose a new security notion named {\it ciphertext unlinkability}, which blurs the link between a ciphertext and its re-encrypted ciphertext to hide the proxy connections between users. We establish the relations between those security notions. As for constructions, we propose two FPRE schemes, one for bounded linear functions and the other for deletion functions, based on the learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption. Our FPRE schemes achieve all the aforementioned desirable securities under adaptive corruptions in the standard model. As far as we know, our schemes provide the {\it first} solution to PRE with security under adaptive corruptions in the standard model.
2022
ASIACRYPT
Privacy-Preserving Authenticated Key Exchange in the Standard Model 📺
You Lyu Shengli Liu Shuai Han Dawu Gu
Privacy-Preserving Authenticated Key Exchange (PPAKE) provides protection both for the session keys and the identity information of the involved parties. In this paper, we introduce the concept of robustness into PPAKE. Robustness enables each user to confirm whether itself is the target recipient of the first round message in the protocol. With the help of robustness, a PPAKE protocol can successfully avoid the heavy redundant communications and computations caused by the ambiguity of communicants in the existing PPAKE, especially in broadcast channels. We propose a generic construction of robust PPAKE from key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), digital signature (SIG), message authentication code (MAC), pseudo-random generator (PRG) and symmetric encryption (SE). By instantiating KEM, MAC, PRG from the DDH assumption and SIG from the CDH assumption, we obtain a specific robust PPAKE scheme in the standard model, which enjoys forward security for session keys, explicit authentication and forward privacy for user identities. Thanks to the robustness of our PPAKE, the number of broadcast messages per run and the computational complexity per user are constant, and in particular, independent of the number of users in the system.
2021
CRYPTO
Authenticated Key Exchange and Signatures with Tight Security in the Standard Model 📺
We construct the first authenticated key exchange protocols that achieve tight security in the standard model. Previous works either relied on techniques that seem to inherently require a random oracle, or achieved only “Multi-Bit-Guess” security, which is not known to compose tightly, for instance, to build a secure channel. Our constructions are generic, based on digital signatures and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). The main technical challenges we resolve is to determine suitable KEM security notions which on the one hand are strong enough to yield tight security, but at the same time weak enough to be efficiently instantiable in the standard model, based on standard techniques such as universal hash proof systems. Digital signature schemes with tight multi-user security in presence of adaptive corruptions are a central building block, which is used in all known constructions of tightly-secure AKE with full forward security. We identify a subtle gap in the security proof of the only previously known efficient standard model scheme by Bader et al. (TCC 2015). We develop a new variant, which yields the currently most efficient signature scheme that achieves this strong security notion without random oracles and based on standard hardness assumptions.
2021
ASIACRYPT
Key Encapsulation Mechanism with Tight Enhanced Security in the Multi-User Setting: Impossibility Result and Optimal Tightness 📺
Shuai Han Shengli Liu Dawu Gu
For Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) deployed in a multi-user setting, an adversary may corrupt some users to learn their secret keys, and obtain some encapsulated keys due to careless key managements of users. To resist such attacks, we formalize Enhanced security against Chosen Plaintext/Ciphertext Attack (ECPA/ECCA), which ask the pseudorandomness of unrevealed encapsulated keys under uncorrupted users. This enhanced security for KEM serves well for the security of a class of Authenticated Key Exchange protocols built from KEM. In this paper, we study the achievability of tight ECPA and ECCA security for KEM in the multi-user setting, and present an impossibility result and an optimal security loss factor that can be obtained. The existing meta-reduction technique due to Bader et al. (EUROCRYPT 2016) rules out some KEMs, but many well-known KEMs, e.g., Cramer-Shoup KEM (SIAM J. Comput. 2003), Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM (CRYPTO 2004), run out. To solve this problem, we develop a new technique tool named rank of KEM and a new secret key partitioning strategy for meta-reduction. With this new tool and new strategy, we prove that KEM schemes with polynomially-bounded ranks have no tight ECPA and ECCA security from non-interactive complexity assumptions, and the security loss is at least linear in the number n of users. This impossibility result covers lots of well-known KEMs, including the Cramer-Shoup KEM, Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM and many others. Moreover, we show that the linear security loss is optimal by presenting concrete KEMs with security loss Θ(n). This is justified by a non-trivial security reduction with linear loss factor from ECPA/ECCA security to the traditional multi-challenge CPA/CCA security.
2020
ASIACRYPT
Two-Pass Authenticated Key Exchange with Explicit Authentication and Tight Security 📺
We propose a generic construction of 2-pass authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme with explicit authentication from key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and signature (SIG) schemes. We improve the security model due to Gjosteen and Jager [Crypto2018] to a stronger one. In the strong model, if a replayed message is accepted by some user, the authentication of AKE is broken. We define a new security notion named ''IND-mCPA with adaptive reveals'' for KEM. When the underlying KEM has such a security and SIG has unforgeability with adaptive corruptions, our construction of AKE equipped with counters as states is secure in the strong model, and stateless AKE without counter is secure in the traditional model. We also present a KEM possessing tight ''IND-mCPA security with adaptive reveals'' from the Computation Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. When the generic construction of AKE is instantiated with the KEM and the available SIG by Gjosteen and Jager [Crypto2018], we obtain the first practical 2-pass AKE with tight security and explicit authentication. In addition, the integration of the tightly IND-mCCA secure KEM (derived from PKE by Han et al. [Crypto2019]) and the tightly secure SIG by Bader et al. [TCC2015] results in the first tightly secure 2-pass AKE with explicit authentication in the standard model.
2019
PKC
Generic Constructions of Robustly Reusable Fuzzy Extractor
Yunhua Wen Shengli Liu Dawu Gu
Robustly reusable Fuzzy Extractor (rrFE) considers reusability and robustness simultaneously. We present two approaches to the generic construction of rrFE. Both of approaches make use of a secure sketch and universal hash functions. The first approach also employs a special pseudo-random function (PRF), namely unique-input key-shift (ui-ks) secure PRF, and the second uses a key-shift secure auxiliary-input authenticated encryption (AIAE). The ui-ks security of PRF (resp. key-shift security of AIAE), together with the homomorphic properties of secure sketch and universal hash function, guarantees the reusability and robustness of rrFE. Meanwhile, we show two instantiations of the two approaches respectively. The first instantiation results in the first rrFE from the LWE assumption, while the second instantiation results in the first rrFE from the DDH assumption over non-pairing groups.
2019
CRYPTO
Tight Leakage-Resilient CCA-Security from Quasi-Adaptive Hash Proof System 📺
Shuai Han Shengli Liu Lin Lyu Dawu Gu
We propose the concept of quasi-adaptive hash proof system (QAHPS), where the projection key is allowed to depend on the specific language for which hash values are computed. We formalize leakage-resilient(LR)-ardency for QAHPS by defining two statistical properties, including LR-$$\langle \mathscr {L}_0, \mathscr {L}_1 \rangle $$-universal and LR-$$\langle \mathscr {L}_0, \mathscr {L}_1 \rangle $$-key-switching.We provide a generic approach to tightly leakage-resilient CCA (LR-CCA) secure public-key encryption (PKE) from LR-ardent QAHPS. Our approach is reminiscent of the seminal work of Cramer and Shoup (Eurocrypt’02), and employ three QAHPS schemes, one for generating a uniform string to hide the plaintext, and the other two for proving the well-formedness of the ciphertext. The LR-ardency of QAHPS makes possible the tight LR-CCA security. We give instantiations based on the standard k-Linear (k-LIN) assumptions over asymmetric and symmetric pairing groups, respectively, and obtain fully compact PKE with tight LR-CCA security. The security loss is $${{O}}(\log {Q_{{e}}})$$ where $${Q_{{e}}}$$ denotes the number of encryption queries. Specifically, our tightly LR-CCA secure PKE instantiation from SXDH has only 4 group elements in the public key and 7 group elements in the ciphertext, thus is the most efficient one.
2018
PKC
Tightly SIM-SO-CCA Secure Public Key Encryption from Standard Assumptions
Lin Lyu Shengli Liu Shuai Han Dawu Gu
Selective opening security (SO security) is desirable for public key encryption (PKE) in a multi-user setting. In a selective opening attack, an adversary receives a number of ciphertexts for possibly correlated messages, then it opens a subset of them and gets the corresponding messages together with the randomnesses used in the encryptions. SO security aims at providing security for the unopened ciphertexts. Among the existing simulation-based, selective opening, chosen ciphertext secure (SIM-SO-CCA secure) PKEs, only one (Libert et al. Crypto’17) enjoys tight security, which is reduced to the Non-Uniform LWE assumption. However, their public key and ciphertext are not compact.In this work, we focus on constructing PKE with tight SIM-SO-CCA security based on standard assumptions. We formalize security notions needed for key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and show how to transform these securities into SIM-SO-CCA security of PKE through a tight security reduction, while the construction of PKE from KEM follows the general framework proposed by Liu and Paterson (PKC’15). We present two KEM constructions with tight securities based on the Matrix Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption. These KEMs in turn lead to two tightly SIM-SO-CCA secure PKE schemes. One of them enjoys not only tight security but also compact public key.
2018
ASIACRYPT
Robustly Reusable Fuzzy Extractor from Standard Assumptions
Yunhua Wen Shengli Liu
A fuzzy extractor (FE) aims at deriving and reproducing (almost) uniform cryptographic keys from noisy non-uniform sources. To reproduce an identical key R from subsequent readings of a noisy source, it is necessary to eliminate the noises from those readings. To this end, a public helper string P, together with the key R, is produced from the first reading of the source during the initial enrollment phase.In this paper, we consider computational fuzzy extractor. We formalize robustly reusable fuzzy extractor (rrFE) which considers reusability and robustness simultaneously in the Common Reference String (CRS) model. Reusability of rrFE deals with source reuse. It guarantees that the key R output by fuzzy extractor is pseudo-random even if the initial enrollment is applied to the same source several times, generating multiple public helper strings and keys $$(P_i,R_i)$$. Robustness of rrFE deals with active probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries, who may manipulate the public helper string $$P_i$$ to affect the reproduction of $$R_i$$. Any modification of $$ {P}_i$$ by the adversary will be detected by the robustness of rrFE. We show how to construct an rrFE from a Symmetric Key Encapsulation Mechanism (SKEM), a Secure Sketch (SS), an Extractor (Ext), and a Lossy Algebraic Filter (LAF). We characterize the key-shift security notion of SKEM and the homomorphic properties of SS, Ext and LAF, which enable our construction of rrFE to achieve both reusability and robustness.We present an instantiation of SKEM from the DDH assumption. Combined with the LAF by Hofheinz (EuroCrypt 2013), homomorphic SS and Ext, we obtain the first rrFE based on standard assumptions.
2016
ASIACRYPT
2015
PKC
2015
PKC
2014
EUROCRYPT
2014
PKC
2013
PKC
2013
ASIACRYPT
2011
PKC

Program Committees

Asiacrypt 2024
Eurocrypt 2023
Asiacrypt 2023
Eurocrypt 2022
Asiacrypt 2022
PKC 2015